The principal-agent problem in coastal development: response to Mills et al

The principal-agent problem in coastal development: response to Mills et al

Abstract
In their article, «Minimizing the Cost of Keeping Options Open for Conservation in a Changing Climate,» Mills et al. (2014) argue that there are very real costs of keeping all options open in response to risks of sea-level rise (SLR) on coastal resources. Rather than maximizing future options, they argue that coastal managers should weigh the actual risks against the opportunity costs. This makes sense because, for land that has a low probability of being inundated, the cost of sacrificing known development benefit is too high relative to the expected benefit of conservation. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
The principal-agent problem in coastal development response to Mills et al

The principal-agent problem in coastal development: response to Mills et al

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