The (Negligible) Benefit of Moving First: Efficiency and Equity in Principal-Agent Negotiations

Like the first-mover in an ultimatum game, the principal is a first-mover with foreknowledge of the agent’s “rational” best response function. The solution to the “principal’s problem” is to choose a contract that maximizes the principal’s expected profit given the agent’s marginal efficacy and marginal effort cost. However, this paper reports experiments that show that principals make large concessions toward an equal division outcome. As in ultimatum games, agents are at times willing to punish principals who are perceived as being overly acquisitive. Variations in agent effort cost and effectiveness that should (theoretically) produce qualitatively different game-theoretic equilibria have little impact on outcomes.

The Negligible Benefit of Moving First Efficiency and Equity in Principal-Agent Negotiations

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply

Tu dirección de correo no será publicada.


Google Analytics