Similar Bidders in Takeover Contests

Yun Dai
Tinbergen Institute – Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR); Duisenberg School of Finance

Sebastian Gryglewicz
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) – Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Han Smit
Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) – Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

Wouter De Maeseneire
Vlerick Business School; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) – Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

July 19, 2013

Abstract:

When bidders in a corporate takeover have related resources and post-acquisition strategies, their valuations of a target are likely to be interdependent. This paper analyzes sequential-entry takeover contests in which similar bidders have correlated private valuations. The level of similarity affects information content of bids and bidding competition. Our model predicts that expected acquisition prices and the probability of multiple-bidder contests are the highest for intermediately similar bidders. We test these predictions in laboratory experiments in which we control the similarity between bidders. The experimental data confirm the non-monotonic effects of similarity on prices and on the frequency of multiple-bidder contents.

Similar Bidders in Takeover Contests

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