Search Frictions and Market Power in Negotiated Price Markets

Jason Allen, Robert Clark, and Jean-François Houde
NBER Working Paper No. 19883
February 2014, Revised April 2014
JEL No. L13,L41,L81
ABSTRACT

This paper develops and estimates a search and bargaining model designed to measure the welfare
loss associated with frictions in oligopoly markets with negotiated prices. We use the model to quantify the consumer surplus loss induced by the presence of search frictions in the Canadian mortgage market, and evaluate the relative importance of market power, inefficient allocation, and direct search costs in explaining the loss. Our results suggest that search frictions reduce consumer surplus by almost $20 per month per consumer, and that 17% of this reduction can be associated with discrimination, 30% with inefficient matching, and the remainder with the search cost.

SEARCH FRICTIONS AND MARKET POWER IN NEGOTIATED PRICE MARKETS

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply

Tu dirección de correo no será publicada.


*


Google Analytics