Bayesian Persuasion

Emir Kamenica
University of Chicago

Matthew Gentzkow
University of Chicago – Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

November 2009

NBER Working Paper No. w15540


When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results.

Bayesian Persuasion

Be the first to comment

Leave a Reply

Tu dirección de correo no será publicada.


Google Analytics